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THE PARADOX OF THE MILITARY RULE IN PAKISTAN
The assumption of political power by the military in a number of Asian
and African states in the late fifties and the early sixties was interpreted
by most scholars as a positive development that would create the
necessary conditions for the protection and promotion of liberal democratic
institutions and facilitate economic development, social change and national
integration in these underdeveloped and fragmented societies One analyst
of Asian affairs described the ascendancy of the military to power as an
opportunity for effecting a "breakthrough from present stagnation into a
genuine developmental take-off"^ While discussing the political implications
2 3of the emergence of the military on the political scene, Shils and Pye
looked at the military as the vehicle of modernization and change
Janowitz, more or less, shared their views on the role of the military in
4.
the political development of these nations Daalder talked about the 
"important developmental role" of the military elite** Similarly a number of
other scholars highlighted the military as a useful instrument of nation
6building, economic development and modernization
The initial optimism about the implication of the establishment of 
the military rule m  Asia and Africa soon gave way to skepticism as 
empirical data became available on their performance m  different states 
and regions Several writers expressed reservations about the ability of
the military regimes to pursue meaningful economic development and social 
change and set up participatory democratic infra-structure Some argued 
that the ability of military rulers "to provide democratic institutions and 
protect democratic practices (appeared) to be less pronounced than that of 
their civilian predecessors"7 Kicole Ball went to the extent of suggesting 
that self-reliant development could not tike place under the military 
regimes He viewed the elimination of the political role of the military as 
"an important prerequisite for the implementation of the sort of self-relient 
development so urgently required in the Third World"8 These writers under­
lined the social, political and professional limitations which adversely 
affected the efficacy of the military regimes and pointed out to the 
political implications of the military's modernizing role for the future 
disposition of the military as well as the post-coup society^ A study 
indicated that the military regimes hardly differed from the non-military 
regimes from the perspective of "economic performance criteria"1^ Another 
study^ comparing data on 77 countries of the Third World during 1960-70, 
concluded that the military was not necessarily an agent of social change.
Its performance in the field of modernization and change was not very 
different from that of the civilian regimes11
The wide discrepancy in their evaluation of the military regimes in 
the Third Woild stems from the fact that these scholars focused on two
different groups of variables and time-frames Emphasizing the organizational 
attributes of the military and the pro-West orientations of most military 
commanders assuming power, the former group of scholars was convinced 
that the man on horseback would salvage the deteriorating political and 
economic situation m  these fragmented polities and, thus, set the tone
(3)
for stable democratic framework What helped them to reach these conclusions 
was the contribution of the military towards nation-building and economic 
development of these societies m  the pre-coup period, and the initial 
successes met by the military regimes in political, economic and social 
sectors The latter group of scholars mainly reviewed the performance of 
the military regimes over an extended period of time and compared their 
performance with their civilian predecessors or other civilian regimes m  
the region The performance of the military regimes has varied so much 
that a blanket statement describing the military as an agent of change and 
development will be unrealistic and too sweeping The military's 
contribution towards nation-building during the pre-coup period and the 
successful execution of a coup d'etat is no guarantee that it will be 
equally successful in ruling the country m  plape of the civil elite
The professional and organizational attributes which facilitate the
assumption of power by the military become the obstacle to finding viable
solutions to the major political and economic problems As a hierarchical
and authoritarian institution, it emphasizes internal, cohesion, discipline
obedience and bureaucratic rigidity It puts "premium on authoritarian
1 «
rather than democratic attitude" This mental framework evaluates 
policy-options b> invoking what it considers "the criteria of rationality 
efficiency and sound administration" " and stresses that 'orders are to be 
°bC{yed, not discussed and debated" ^ This has two major consequences for 
the military regime First, the political institutions they create reflect
\
these ethos and provide little room for dialogue, bargaining, accommodation
and participation Second, they demonstrate a strong distaste for competitive
and participatory political activity and adopt an impatient attitude
towards dissent They, at times, attempt to achieve what has been described
15"as "cohesion without consensus" by relying on the control apparatus of 
the state This provides a temporary relief to the regime but in the long 
run it evokes more opposition and accentuates political cleavage In this 
way the military regime’s efforts to create a viable political order are 
frustrated by the very policies it adopts to achieve this goal
The extended stay m  power or the repeated intervention in politics 
by the military commanders have their own trappings Once they get used 
to the pleasures of exercising supreme political power under the cover of 
martial law or emergency decrees, they do not feel like surrendering 
all of it Therefore, they favor a political framework for the state 
which will ensure the continuity of the policies introduced by them and 
protect most, if not all, benefits enjoyed by them
There are different courses of action available to them to achieve 
these goals First, the military commanders transfer power to those who 
share their political perspective or establish a pupet civil government 
Second, they watch the civil government vary carefully and if something 
goes against their wishes they pressurize or threaten to assume power to 
compel the civil leaders to adopt particular policies Several military 
leaders favor a permanent legal guarantee for the exercise of this power 
over the civil government Third, the ruling generals resign their 
military rank and civilianize their regime by coopting civilians
If the military commanders cannot evolve a political framework
reflecting any of these principles or a combination thereof, they are 
reluctant to transfer power to their civilian counterparts unless certain 
unforeseen developments force them to do so, i e external intervention 
defeat in a war, dissension amongst the senior commanders, etc Such a 
delay evokes strong opposition from different section of population and 
political elite who find themselves excluded from the political process 
and confronts the military with a host of problems not different from 
those faced ky their predecessor civil regime, i e crisis of legitimacy, 
inability to create self-sustaining political institutions, the continued 
reliance on the regulative and coercive apparatus of the state, a widespread 
political alienation This dilutes the gains and good will, if any 
obtained by the military rulers in the initial period of assumption of 
power The consequent desenchantment with military rule gives an impetus 
to the view that the extended military rule is by itself the main impediment 
to the establishment of a participatory political framework and that the 
civil leaders be given ’another chance'
The Pakistan military is highly professional and cohesive It has 
employed its organizational resources and technological skills to extend 
useful help to civil authorities and to facilitate nation-building and 
other developmental activities^ It performance suffered when it took 
upon itself the responsibilities of running the administration of the 
state This has been despite the fact that on all the three occasions 
—  1958, 1969, 1977 —  the military moved out of its barracks to displace 
the discredited regimes and consolidated hold over power without facing 
any serious challenge All the three military regimes registered a number 
of initial gains, i e restoration of law and order, resumption of normal
economic activities some measure of efficiency m  the administrative 
routines, steps against black-marketing, smuggling and corruption A 
couple of policy measures won appreciation for the military regime of Ayub 
Khan as a modernizing and benevolent dictatorship ( Family Laws and Land 
Reforms) But when came to the creation of a viable participatory 
framework for political action and an infra-structure for ensuring socio­
economic justice, their performance was no better than their civilian 
predecessors In many respects these problems became more complex with 
greater ramifications on regional and ethnic interactions in the polity
The Ayub regime (1958-62, 1962-69), often described as the 'showcase 
for economic development and stability'^ ran aground while dealing with 
the participatory and distributive pressures on "£he political system The 
stability given by the Ayubian system was personalized rather than 
institutionalized It came to an end under worse condition than those which 
had led to assumption of power by Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1958 
General Yahya Khan (1969-71) lacked political insight and ability to steer 
Pakistan out of the then existing East-West Pakistan political crisis 
His inability to maintain a balance between the diverse political, economic, 
social and regional forces plunged the country into one of the most 
unfortunate civil war6 of the 20th Century Instead of restoring democratic 
institutions he presided over the dismemberment of Pakistan
The limits of the military rulers to create viable political 
institutions facilitating political participation, stability, continuity 
and socio-economic justice have, once again, surfaced during the period of 
General Zia-ul-Huq's martial law in Pakistan General Zia-ul-Huq assumed 
power on July 5, 197/, by overthrowing Z A Bhutto's government as a
"caretaker" ruler to save the country from "political choas" He promised 
to hold "fair and free elections within 90 days and return power to the 
elected representatives" However, 5£ years have passed since he made 
the promise Neither the elections have been held nor there are any prospects 
of transfer of power to the civil in the near future
EXPANSION OF THE GOALS OF THE COUP 
The military regime is now operating with the *raessiah' and 'savior' 
complex General Zia-ul-Huq ascribes to himself the Gord-ordained mission 
of transforming the Pakistani society on 'Islamic lines' and emphasizes that 
as long as a ruler in an Islamic state (i e Zia in Pakistan) is performing 
his duties in accordance with the 'Quran' and 'Sunnah' "nobody can challenge' 
him, though he has never spelled out the operational criteria to evaluate 
the performance of a rulet m  an Islamic state He made it quite clear on
more than one occasion that he would not go back to the barracks a6 long
I
as the mission of moral renewal and Islaraization was not completed "We 
(the military) have no intention of leaving power till the accomplishment 
of our objectives of Islamization of the national polity and induction of 
decency m  politics Until then neither I (General Zia) will step down nor 
will let any one rise"^°
This disposition of the military regime is drastically different 
from its posture at the time of, and soon after, the assumption of power 
The 90-day 'Operation Fairplay'as the military rulers described their coup 
of July 1977, started with a cetegoncal promise of holding elections 
General Zia-ul-Huq declared
My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which would 
be neld in October this year Soon after tic polls, power will be 
transferred to the elected representatives of the people I give a 
solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule During
the next three months my total attention wilL be concenti iteci on the 
holding of elections and I would not like to dissipate my powers 
and energies as Chief Martial Lav/ Administrator on anything else
During the last 5^ ve^rs the military rulers have expanded the goals 
of the coup and made several shifts in their political priorities culminating 
into the present emphasis on 'Islamization' and rdecencyvin politics The 
following table outlines the changing pattern of the political priorities 
and expansion or goals of the military regime since July 1977, when it 
ousted Bhutto from power
Approximate Date Major Priorities
July 1977 Elections within 90-days and transfei 
of power to the elected representatives 
(Election date fixed Oct 18, 1977)
October 1977 (Elections postponed)
Accountability of the ousted regime 
Islamization
February-March 1979 Islamization
Elections (Date fixed Nov 17, 1979)
September-October 1979 (Elections postponed)
Islamization and restructuring of the 
politico-economic system 
Induction of decency in Politics
January-February 1980 Islamization and restructuring of the 
politico-economic system.
Moral renewal and decency in politics 
Defense of territorial and ideological 
boundaries m  the backdrop of the 
Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan
; wi ;
(i) Postponement of the National Elections
Soon after the assumption of power, the military rulers fixed the 
election date The machinery to oversee the elections was also set in motion 
But there appeared a clear change in the strategy of the military rulers by 
the beginning of October 1977 The elections were postponed indefinitely 
and the accountability of the ousted Bhutto regime replaced the elections 
as the major priority of the military WC shall discuss the circumstances 
leading to this shift m  the next section
It was shortly before the Supreme Court finally condemned Bhutto to 
death that a new date (November 17, 1979) for the national elections was 
announced As the political parties were getting ready for the election 
campaign the military rulers started changing the ground rules for the 
elections and took a number of steps which were disputed by different 
political parties on one ground or another The major electoral changes 
introduced by the military regime included Ci) the system of separate 
electorate for the Muslims and non-Muslims, (n) Proportional representation 
instead of simple major lty-smgle^ constituency system, ( m )  an amendment 
m  the Political Parties Act, 1962, which called for (a) registration of 
political parties v/ith the Election Commission as a pre-requisite for taking 
part in the national elections, (b) submission of accounts of the parties 
to the Election Commission for scrutiny, (c) publication of a formalI
manifesto, (d) holding of annual elections for the office bearers of the 
party, (e) submission of a list of office bearers and ordinary members to 
to Election Commission The Election Commission could refuse registration 
to any political party unable to fulfil any of these conditions The 
political parties not registered with, or refused registration by the 
Election Commission could not take part in the national elections
{LO)
These policy measures were opposed by several political parties and 
some of the major political parties including the People's Party and the 
Tehnk-i-Istiqlal, refused to file registration papers Amidst these 
controversies the military rulers decided to hold local bodies elections 
prior to national election on non-party basis Most political parties 
opposed this move on the grounds that the political parites were disallowed 
to take part in the local bodies polls and that the military rulers had 
suddenly decided to hold these ahead of the national elections Despite 
the negative response of the political parties the military authorities 
went ahead with the local bodies polls Much to their dismay a large number 
of people having ties with the political parites, especially with the 
People's Party, got elected The success of the pro-People Party candidates 
alarmed the military rulers They found themselves in a dilemma If they 
excluded the People's Party from the electoral process the credibility of 
the national election would be in doubt If they allowed the People's Party 
to take part m  the national elections it was, in view of the results of 
the local bodies polls, expected to perform better than its rightist 
adversaries The military, therefore, came to the conclusion that the time
was not ripe for holding election and announced their postponment for the
2 3second time because they did not want to repeat the "mistake" made by 
General Yahya Khan in 1971 —  refusal to transfer power after the holding of 
national elections
Since then the promise to hold elections at an 'appropriate time' m  
the future has been frequently repeated Not many people give credence to 
these promises because the military leaders have made it quite clear that 
no elections and transfer of power will take place unless they are sure 
that the people who share their political persepetive will be elected They
a t )
advance several reasons to side-track the demand for elections and transfer 
of power At times the military rulers call upon people to work for the
2 Lf
•welfare and good' of everybody rather than asking for national elections
Sometimes the need for establishment of an ’Islamic system of democracy' is
9cited as a higher priority At other times they emphasize that elections 
could not be held without a guarantee of 'positive' results —  an indirect 
way of saying that as long as the prospects of the left of the centre 
parties, especially the People’s Party performing better than the rightists, 
no elections could be held At still other times regional strategic
27
environment is referred to as the reason for not holding early elections 
Pakistan's Interior Minister, Mahmood A Haroon, was quite forthright when
he declared that there could be no national elections as long as the Soviet
troops stayed in Afghanistan On top of all thi6 General Zia-ul-Huq claims
that if the majoiity makes a wrong decision it can be turned down because,
in his opinion, Islam does not believe m  the rule of majority Only a 'correct
3*)
decision' needs to be honored even if it iS~ supported by a minority
(li) The Process of Accountability
The three month long agitation against the Bhutto government convinced 
the military commanders that the People's Party had run out of steam and 
that Bhutto would be politically dead once he was dethroned This appraisal 
was reinforced by tnc quick capitulation of the ruling People's Party to the 
coup The military leaders did not visualize any problem in holding national 
elections in 90 days and transferring power to the P N A (the opposition
alliance) which was, m  their opinion, sure to win the forthcoming polls 
These calculations were greatly upset by the massive turn-out of people on 
the eve of Bhutto's first visit to Lahore, Multan and Karachi after being
released from the 'protective custody' of the military regime This
demonstrated that despite the overthrow of his government and defections in
30his People's Part/ he did not altogether lose his popular base This 
encouraged Bhutto to pursue the October 1977 election campaign aggressively 
because he did not want his support to fizzle out by adopting a low profile 
He began to defy martial authorities and threatened them with retribution 
if he was elected
This put the ruling generals on the horns of a dilemma If they
ignored Bhutto's clear violations of the martial law regulations, the
credibility of the martial law regime would have been compromised and Bhutto
would have been able to sway more votes to his side On the other nand if
they reacted sharply, there was bound to be a direct confrontation between
the military and the People's Party The military commanders decided to
adopt thè latter course The need for such policy was also underlined by
the strong "fears” on the part of the ruling generals and the P N A that
the People's Party would either win the October polls or perform better
31than its right-wing political adversaries* By an interesting coincidnece 
it was during these days that the military leaders became aware of Bhutto's 
"misdeeds" and hxs "machiavellian" style of rule They, therefore, decided 
to get even with Bhutto by postponing national elections and instituting 
inquiries into the cases of irregularities by his government They also 
reopened I the murder case of Nawab Mohammad Ahipad Khan, involving Bhutto as 
a co-conspirator Later the process of accountability was extended to cover 
other senior officials of the Bhutto government and members of his People's 
party
While the process of accountability was underway and Bhutto's own 
case was under trial , a massive propaganda campaign of corruption and
abuse of power was launched against Bhutto and his ousted regime The state 
controlled radio, T V , and the government owned newspapers took the lead 
A number of n g h - w m g  dailies and weeklies orchestrated the same tune The 
martial law authorities issued several White Papers spread over 2,771 pages 
describing how Bhutto rigged the March 1977 elections and how he and his 
family undermined the governmental institutions and procedures and obtained 
or extended to others illegal favors General Zia-ul-Huq characterized 
Bhutto as the "worst cheat and cold-blooded murderer" who "had been running 
a Gestapo style police state m  which kidnapping and political murders 
had become a routine affair" He very confidently said that Bhutto and
his colleagues would not be able to escape punishment and that the martial
, 33law powers would be used against such "criminals" The national leadership
and mostjparty activists of the People's Party were placed under detention
at one time or another during the 5^ years of martial law A large number
of them were tried before the special military courts and convicted, while
some were kept in detention for varying periods without trial
The tough attitude of the military government kept the People's Party
off-balance and, coupled with the People's Party's organizational weaknesses,
it undermined the ability of the party to launch a mass movement against
the military government This, however, dragged the military in political
controversies to the point of no return An impression was created as if
it was a personal conflict between the ruling generals and Bhutto This
feeling was strengthened by the efforts of the martial law government to
win over Bhutto's political adversaries on the .Right and a considerable
freedom enjoyed by a number of right-wing fundamentalist groups to engage
in a low key political activity, especially in opposition to the People's
Party
Bhutto's execution in pursuance of the split judgement of the Supreme 
Court eliminated him physically from the political scene but his name, 
despite his reputation for corruption and despotism, is a formidable political 
force and the People's Party continues to enjoy a strong following amongst 
the rural and urban poor in the Punjab and Sind In any national elections 
m  the future, Bhutto's name and the fact that he was put to death by the 
military government will be an asset for the People's Party
(1 1 1) Alignment with the Political Right
I
It was for the first time m  Pakistan's history that the military 
authorities exercising the supreme political power openly declared that 
they werp rightist m  their orientations and forged political ties with 
several groups of the Right The following excrept from an interview
of General Zia-ul-Huq is quite instructive
Question There are rumors that yours is a rightist regime and you 
intend to suppress the leftist before holding elections 
Would you comment on this ?
Zia I have no dispute on this I am a rightist.
Question How would you go about suppressing the leftist? This has 
created fears among the leftist - for example, the former 
National Awami Party
Zia Well, the soon the leftist wake up and come on the middle of
the road, the better it would be for them, because I have now 
started tightening my grip We have no place for too many 
extremists
Question
Zia
There are different types of leftists extremists, moderates 
etc
3l+
There is nothing much to choose among them
General Zia-ul-Huq*s early socialization in a deeply religious home- 
environment and his preference forthe orthodox-fundamentalist interpretation of 
Islam created a natural sympathy in his heart for the political parties of 
the Right, especially those religion-oriented parties which shared his
Jperspective on Islam The catalyst for the Right-military rulers partnership 
was the military's decision to initiate the process of accountability and 
contain the resurging influence of the People's Party The military rulers 
thought that an understanding with these political groups would extend the 
government's political base, facilitate the introduction of fundamentalist 
Islamic reforms m  the political system, and encourage the development of
a viable leadership from amongst these groups as an alternative to the 
People's Party
The military rulers' alignment with the Right can be divided into 
two phases
The First. Phase 1978-79 - The P N A -  an alliance of ? political 
parties which contested the March 1977 elections against the People's Party- 
agreed to join the cabinet of General Zia-ul-Huq, ostansiblj to facilitate 
Islamizaron of the polity and prepare the country for the national elections 
This cooperation which lasted until two weeks after Bhutto's execution in 
April 1979, proved useful for the military in dealing with political 
dissidents and made the military rule partly civiliamzed and humane, at least 
to the Right But it could neither throw up an alternative leadership the 
military could trust and ultimately transfer power nor it eroded the bases 
of support for the dissident Left and those political parties in the Right
which were not prepared to join hands with the military rulers. Several 
reasons account for that
First, not all the constitutent elements of the P N.A were equally 
inclined towards active cooperation with the military Tehnk-i-Istiqlal, 
the J V P.(Jamiat-i-UIma-i-Pakistan), and the N.D.P (National Democratic 
Party) did not favor close identification with the military regime These
political parties gradually withdrew from the P N A as its leadership moved 
closer to the military regime The exit of these three political parties 
weakened the P M A This also meant that a section of the kight stood aloof 
from the political arrangements between the P H*A and the military Second, 
the P N A went tnrough a process of degeneration There were personality, 
policy and factional conflicts There was a temporary split in the Muslim 
League This was followed by an open confrontation between a faction of the 
Muslim League and the Jamaat—1—Islami Out of the constitutent elements of 
the P N.A., the Jamaat-i-Islami was extending the most enthusiastic 
cooperation to the military and there was periodic grumbling on what other 
parties in the P N A considered greater tilt of the military towards the 
Jamaat-i-Islami and vice versa
Third, the military and the P N A. were cooperating with each other 
for dissimilar considerations The military leaders hoped that the 
inclusion of representatives of some political parties would give political 
legitimacy to their rule and help to bring about the politico-economic 
changes m  the polity as desired by them The P«N«A* thought that, m  
addition to 'sharing the credit' for the Islaraization of the polity, the 
exercise of power would enable them to distribute state patronage amongst 
their party-men and strengthen their political base* The P«N«A* ministers 
soon realized that the military rulers did not want to share effective 
power The ruling generals and the top bureaucrats often bypassed the 
ministers on important policy matters This also impaired the P N A ministers' 
ability to distribute state patronage amongst their workers which caused 
frustration among them The military rulers were also somewhat disappointed 
because of the intra-P N A s q u a b b y  the ministers' desire to operate like
(17)
a political government and, what was described as the reluctant support of 
the P N A to the military
It was after the introduction of the first set of Islamic laws in 
February 1979 the refixation of the election date (November 1979) m  
March 1979, and the execution of Dhutto in April 1979, that the P N A 
decided to loosen its ties with the military It withdrew its ministers from 
the cabinet but assured the military commanders of its continuous cooperation
35~from outside of the government The military commanders did not ask the 
P N.A ministers to stay on
The Second Phase 1979 to the Present - The second pahse of alignment 
between the Right and the military saw the crystalisation of the "like- 
mindedness" between the military and the Jamaat-i-Islami Another constituent 
element of the P N * - the Muslim League (Pagano Group) also maintained a 
favorable disposition towards the military but more significant than this 
was the burgeoning understanding between the military and the Jamaat-i-Islami 
—  a fundamentalist religlious party with a hierarchical structure and 
highly disciplined cadre. The roots of this cooperative relationship can be 
traced back to the first phase when the Jamaat-i-Islami, like the Muslim 
League (Pagaro group) was more keen to join the martial law government than 
other parties in the P.N.A and made Lt clear that it would joifl the government 
even if the P N A did not
After the decision of the military rulers to postpone the national 
elections scheduled for November 1979, for the second time, many rightist 
political groups, especially the J.U.I. (Jaraiat-i-Ulraa-i-Islam) which 
served as the king-pm m  the P N.A., were alienated from the military The 
growing cleavage between a number of the rightist political parties and the
military made It imperative for the military to cultivate those groups in 
the Right which were still sympathetic towards the military These included 
the Jamaat-i-Islami and the highly orthodox 'ulma'(religious leaders) and 
their followers e
The military rulers and the Jamaat-i-Islami have realized that, despite 
some diffeienees in their perspectives, a cooperative interaction will be 
mutually rewarding. Overtly they maintain a distance from each other The 
martial law authorities do arrest and convict the Jaraaat activists 
Similarly the Jamaat leaders maKe adverse comments on the performance of 
the martial law regime Ihese are basically bargaining tactics to maximize 
the possible gains of the cooperative interaction by showing their ability 
to be rough on each other. The arrested Jamaat activists are always quietly 
released and the Jamaat leadership opposes political agitation against the 
military regime, especially the one spearheaded by the left of the centre 
political groups
The Jamaat-i-Islami has benefited by enjoying a relative freedom 
for engaging in a low-key poltical activity and extending its influence m  
the bureaucracy, the military, the mass media and educational institutions.
For the military government the threat of political agitation by a political 
party with a highly disciplined cadre has been temporarily eliminated. The 
Jamaat has also helped the military to undercut the efforts by other political 
groups to launch a political agitation against the military governemt The 
Janaat's support to the military was quite crucial m  the period immediately 
after Bhutto’s execution in April 1979. A few hours before Bhutto's 
execution the chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Tufail Ihihammad, met with 
General Zia-ul-Huq It was not known what transpired between them but rfhat 
the Jamaat Chief said to the newspaper correspondents after the meeting
was quite revealing He said that Bhutto's execution would not lead to the 
deterioration of political situation If at all that happened^his party 
would take care of that37 After Bhutto's execution the 'hard-core' of the 
Jamaat were clearly visible m  several urban centres The Jamaat-i-Islami 
through its student wing, has helped the authorities to defuse the agitational 
potential of Pakistan's politicized universities by intimidating the 
dissident students and faculty and, at times, by influencing the exercise 
of discretionary powers and patronage by the university authorities
The other major group cultivated by the military comprises the 
extremely orthodox religious leaders and their followers The> hold 
extremely conservative political, social and economic views and are 
opposed to participatory political process They support the povernmcnt 
decision to postpone elections indefinitely and favor the use of all the 
resources of the state including the coercive power, to effect the "fötal 
and immediate' Islamization of the society
More important than their support to the martial law regime has been 
their role as the surrogates of the military in political confrontation 
between the military government and those who are opposed to the government 
The$<c religious leaders constantly engage in the criticism and condemnation 
of the left of the centre political groups and describe them as secularists 
and communists — > two most despised political labels in Pakistan This 
diverts the attention of several political groups from the military 
government to these religious leaders, and, from the basic political issues 
to the secondary and non-central issues played up by these ultra rißKt 
religiou leaders
(ïv) Islamization
The 1Islamization' of the polity has emerged as the cardinal concern 
of the martial law regime Some attribute this to the disposition of 
General Zia-ul-Iluq who had the reputation of being a religious person even 
before coming to power What amaze6 most is that the desire to restructure 
the polity on Islamic lines did not appear prominently in the early days of 
the martial law regime In his first speech after coming to power General 
Zia-ul-Huq took note of the resurgence of Islamic sentiments m  the anti- 
Bhutto movment and declared that he considered the introduction of Islamic 
system "as an essential prerequisite" for Pakistan However, the theme 
of 'Islamization' was not pressed hard by the military regime While 
presenting the government point-of-view before the Supreme Court in the 
well-known Begum Bhutto case, the defense council did not highlight 
'Islamization' as the main objective of the martial law regime The Supreme 
Court, while legitimizing the imposition of martial law under the doctrine 
of necessity, conditioned it with "the earliest possible holding of free 
and fair elections for the purpose of the restoration of democratic 
institutions under the 1973 Constitution"^
As the commitment of the martial law regime to hold elections on 
October 18, 1977, wavered,and as a confrontation started developing between 
the martial law authorities and the People's Party, the need for the 
•Islamization' of politics and society began to figure prominently in their 
speeches and statements Once the elections were pushed to the background 
and the accountability of the ousted regime was initiated, 'Islamization' 
was employed as raison d'etre of the martial law regime The 'Islamization' 
process comprised three aspects First, efforts to mobilize and forge a 
cooperative relationship with those sections of people which shared the
regime's perspective on the 'Islamization' of the Pakistani polit> This has 
been discussed in the previous section Second, the reliance on the 
conservative Islamic tenents to introduce (or make proposals for) changes 
in the 1973 Constitution This will be examined m  the next section Third, 
introduction of several measures, including new laws, administrative actions 
and guidelines for imbibing Islamic spirit in the society
The major focus of the 'Islamization' drive has been regulative and 
punitive with very little effort to project other characteristics of Islam 
i e social and economic egalitarianism and accountability of those 
exercising authority A series of laws pertaining to the imposition of 
"Islamic punishments" for certain crimes were enforced A Tederal Shariat 
Court was established and a promise was nade to set up "Islamic courts' at 
all levels The 'Interest free' banking counters (the Profit and Loss 
Sharing Accounts) were opened in all commercial banks, though once funds 
were deposited in the PLS account, these were used by the banks in the 
same way as were the funds in the conventional saving accounts Interest
on these PLS accounts was designated as profit A compulsory 'Zakat'
(2—  / annual deduction from saving accounts) was impsoed and the government 
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used this fund for helping the poor Annother annual tax 'Usher' —  on 
farm produce has been introduced from 1983 The mass media was directed 
to reflect the orthodox Islamic values, film censor was made stricter 
than ever, and various cultural activities considered not in conformity 
with the fundamentals of Islam were discouraged The government offices 
were ordered to make specific provisions for prayer in their schedules and 
the heads of departments were advised to lead the prayer for the staff or
make alternate arrangements
The 'l8lamization' process had its problems A number of Muslim sects 
who did not share the establishment's perspective on Islam resented the 
lack of adequate attention to their religious sensitivities The most 
forceful expression of resentment was made by the Shia sect Under the 
leadership of their religious leaders they staged a massive protest in 
Islamabad m  the Summer of 1980 against the compulsory deduction of 'Zakat' 
by the government The government^ fearing that it might kick off agitation 
m  other cities, with political parties jumping on the bandwagen, gave in 
and made 'Zakat' voluntary for the Shia sect Tension between the Shias 
and one of the most conservative Sunni sect — ■ the Wahabis —  who arc 
generally supportive of the government, has surfaced quite often
Several religious groups favoring a participatory and an egalitamn 
Islamic system have also been critical of the authoritarian enforcement of 
Islam from the above, that too, of its punitive and regulative aspects 
They (especially the J U P ) believe that this strategy may help the military 
to maintain a political status quo in the country but it is not likely to 
solve the major social and political problems of the common folks and, thus, 
will prove counter-productive to the goal of 'Islamization' of the Pakistani 
society The left of the centre groups, especially the People’s Party, 
are the strongest ciitics of the government's drive for 'Islamization' as 
they have suffered most under this martial law and the 'Islamization' 
process has been used by the military regime to contain and undermine their 
political activities
(v) Towards A New Political System
The military rulers did not abrogate the 1973 Constitution at the 
time of assumption of power m  1977 Some of its articles were suspended 
Whey they decided to expand their goals by initiating accountability and 
*Islamization', Several changes were gradually made in the 1973 Constitution 
to strengthen the position of the martial law authorities The major target 
of these changes was the supenoi judiciary which was slowly stripped off 
of its power of judicial review and writ jurisdiction In March 1981, a 
Provisional Constitutional Order replaced what was left of the 1973 
Constitution which completely subordinated the superior judiciary to the 
martial law authorities 15 judges of the superior courts (Supreme Court 
4 including the Chief Justice, Punjab High Court 7, Sind High Court 2, 
and Baluchistan High Court 2 including the Chief Justice) either refused 
or were disallowed to take oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order 
They lost their jobs In December 1981, an all-nominated Federal Council 
(Majlis-i-Shoora) was set-up This advisory body has no law-making and 
financial powers which has reduced it to a grand debating society whose 
expenses are paid by the state-treasury
General Zia-ul-Huq's views on the future shape of the political system 
are not fully articulate He talks m  terms of cliches and doctrines without 
fully operationalizing them or allowing an open debate on these issues 
We can, howevoi identify the following major themes in his speeches and 
statements -
1 The military rulers have made up their mind not to restore the 
1973 Constitution, at least in its original shape
2 They want to introduce what they call the "Islamic Democratic System«'
Under this system they will like to (i) either completely do away
with political parties or put severe restrictions on their role,
(ii) introduce numeious changes m  the electoral process allowing 
the military government to do the pre-election secrenmg of candidates 
m  one way or the other, tilt the electoral process in favor of the 
orthodox and fundamentalist groups, (1 1 1) provide a strong federal 
executive with a docile legislature, (ïv) a complete overhaul of the 
judicial system providing for a limited power of judicial review of 
the executive action^and the setting up of the "Qazin courts, presided 
over by those who have the tnowledge of "Fiqh", preferably the 
religious leaders
3 A constitutional guarantee enabling the military to share the 
decision-making power with the political elite and to warn or 
displace them when the military commanders are convinced that their 
(politicians) policies would jeopardise stability and integrity of 
the country
The military leaders are finding it difficult to implement all these 
principles as there is a difference of opinion amongst those who support 
the military regime as to the operationalization of these principles Two 
key institutions, relevant to the 'Isiamlzation1 pf the polity, do not fully 
endorse General Zia-ul-HuqJs political framework The Federal Shariat Court —  
set up by the military government as a part of its1Islamisation1 drive —  
rejected several petitions seeking the Courts injunction that, among other 
things, political parties, the electoral process as outlined in the 1973 
Constitution, and parliamentary system of government were un-Islamic.
These petitions were filed by a number of orthodox persons who were generally 
supporti/e of the military regime« The dismissal of these petitions provided 
political ammunition to those who did not favor restrictions on political
parties and the circumventing of the democratic process Another advisory
body appointed by the President-—  the Council of Islamic Ideology —  refused
to go along with General Zia-ul-Huq's political views all the way It$
report on the future shape of the political system did not endorse the
official standpoint on party system and electoral process It recommended
a federal system, universal adult franchise, separate electorate and right 
oo
to vote for women It did not favor the holding of elections on non-party 
40basis The military government, for obvious reasons, returned the report 
to the Council of Islamic Ideology for reconsideration
The most controversial proposal has been the one envisaging a 
permanent constitutional arrangement for the sharing of power between the 
top brass of the military and the political elite This was not for the 
first time that such a proposal was mooted General Yahya Khan assigned 
the power of suspending the constitution to the Chief of Army Staff in
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his proposed constitution which could not be implemented due to the 
surrender of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and the 
subsequent transfer of power to Bhutto in December 1971 The 1973 Constitution 
restricted the functions of the military to defense against external 
aggression or threat of war, and assistance to the civil authorities when 
called upon to do so^^" The present military rulers want to expand the scope 
of their function b> adding the responsibility of 'overall development 
and defense of ideological frontiers"^It is an indirect way of ascnbmp 
a permanent role m  domestic politics to the military General Zia-ul-Huq 
proposed a Higher Command Council comprising the President, the Prime Minister, 
the Defense Minister and the three Service Chiefs with powers to "take 
decision on vital and important issues"^ At times, he talked about a 
constitutional provision allowing the military to take over the reins of
U b J
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government at the time of 'national emergency These ideas have met with 
more opposition than other political and constitutional suggestions With 
the exception of the government circles and the government controlled 
newspapers, this proposal was either not welcomed or was totally opposed 
All political parties, including the pro-military Jamaat-i-Islami and the 
Muslim League (Pagaro Group) have made adverse comments on the proposal for 
a constitutional role for the military m  domestic politics
POLITICAL IMPASSE, DISSENT, AND CONTROL
These policy measures —  the postponement of the national elections, 
the initiation of the process of accountability, the alignment with the 
political Right, Islamization, and the restructuring of the polity —  have 
moved the military so far away from their original goal that they can neither 
go back nor they find it easy to move ahead with their expanded goals 
Despite their best efforts the military authorities who, after staying m  
power for over 5jyears -— longer than Bhutto —  find themselves in a greater 
political impasse than the one they set out to resolve in 1977
The present military rulers are confronted with an extremely complex 
political situation The people are not so politically docile as was the 
case when Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958 A number of development in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s have made people more assertive and politicized 
These developments include the 1968-69 anti-Ayub movement, the elections 
and the Cast Pakistan crisis (1970-71), Bhutto's style of mass politics, the 
1977 elections and the P.N.A movement agmst the Bhutto regime In such 
a politicized environment the Zia regime put severe restrictions on political 
activities and talked of "depoliticizmg" the society But the policies 
it adopted contributed to greater political controversies and polarisation
U7)
in Pakistan The major step that eluded their goal of "dcpoliticization11 
of the polity was their decision to identify the regime with the political 
Right and tamper with the fundamental features of the 1973 Constitution A.s 
a result the Righ-Left polarisation affected people at all levels and in 
all wall s of life Many found themselves extremely vulnerable or isolated 
unless they tilted towards one side or the other This compromised the 
political autonomy of the regime and made its credentials as an 'impartial 
broker' unacceptable to those who suffered because of the orientation and 
policies of the military regime This undermined the ability of the military 
regime to find viable solutions of the intricate political problems, 
especially the problems of evolving a participatory framework, and 
confronted the military rulers with the kind of dilemmas which led to the 
failure of their predecessor civil regime, i e the ever-deepening 
participatory crisis, the lack of consensus on the operational norms of the 
political system, the fragility of the civil institutions, economic 
disparities between regions and people, and the growing political alienation
If the military finds itself bogged down in the political arena, the 
performance of the political leaders and political parties ts not commendable 
either They have been unable to generate enough political pressure which 
could force the military out of power Political parties in Pakistan have 
Israel » t lonal ly been weak, suffering from intra- and inter-party conflicts 
based on personality, political orientations, ethnicity-cum-regionalism, 
and political opportunism They formed political alliances in the past but 
these proved fragile because of mutual distrust and squabbl€£ These 
problems continue to afflict the political parties during the present 
martial law period The P N A degenerated to such an extent that it 
cannot operate as a unified body against the government or the left of the
centre political parties
The People'8 Party was never allowed to develop a viable organizational 
network by its founder-leader, Bhutto Once the party lost power and Bhutto 
was put out of effective circulation by the military rulers, the People's 
Party was in a disarray It, no doubt enjoyed a widespread support at the 
mass level and, if elections were held it was likely to perform better than 
its right-wing political rivals, but it was unable to transform its support 
into a mass movement due to its leadership and organizational problems The 
People's party was also hurt by the irresponsible attitude of some of its 
adherents - the hijacl m g  of the P I A aircraft by al-Zulfikar Though the 
People's Part* leadership condemned the liijacl ing and declared that it had 
no connections with al-Zulfikar, the fact that the eldest son of the executed 
Prime Minister led the al-Zulfikar operation, did not fully absolve the 
People Party of the blame for the hijacking This provided a convenient 
excuse to the martial law authorities to further clamp down political activities 
and arrest the dissidents
Several attempts were made to put up a challenge to the military regime 
either by creating a united front (i e the M R.D in Feb-March 1981) or by 
efforts to launch protest movements Lawyers and journalists have been the 
most vocal critics of the military regime The lawyers have been holding 
periodic conventions since the summer of 1980 The latest series of conventions 
took place in Septembar-October 1982 which turned out to be an open
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confrontation between them and the military government On all these 
occasions the military rulers were able to contain the dissenting groups, 
at least for the time being
In addition to mobilising the pro-military groups, the military leaders
have pursued the policy of swift action against any political activity ¿imed
at the militar/ regime before it takes-off The approach is 'isolate and 
suppress' which comprises a number of related actions First, discouragement 
to, or restriction on, the press (including censorship) to publish the views 
of the dissenting politicisna The private printers run the risk of heavy 
financial and legal penalities for printing their views in the form of 
booklets or pamphlets Second, restrictions on the movement of political 
leaders House arrest, detention or restriction on their inter-provincial 
or inter-city travel so that they are not able to establish a rapport with 
each other Some of the political leaders including Air Marshal (Retd )
Asghar khan, Mrs IJusrat Bhutto Banazii Bhutto, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, 
and General (Retd ) Tikka Khan have been under house arrest for periods 
ranging from 3 months to over 3 years Some of them are still under house- 
airest Third, warnings to desist from making statements Denial of permission 
to hold closed-door meetings of political activists at somebody's residence, 
not to speak of public meeting or mass-contact tour Fourth, periodic arrests 
of political leaders, especially the political activists at the middle and 
the lowest levels under the martial law regulations whereby no writ can be 
filed in the regular civilian courts for their release Some are released 
after a few da>s or weeks. Others are sentenced to imprisonment and/or 
whipping b> the military courts Still other are kept m  detention without 
trial for montns
Two other factors need to be identified which have compromised the 
ability of the politicians to launch a political movement against the military 
government First, a fairly reasonable pace of economic development was 
maintained during the last 4-5 years There were no food shortages More 
important than this has been the inflow of funds in the form of remittances 
by the Pakistanis working abroad, mainly in the Gulf and the Middle Eastern
States The Middle East bonanza or the Gulf connection of the Pakistan 
economy has made more runds available to a substantial number of the lower 
middle and the lowest class families, thereby enabling them to absorb the 
shocks of inflation and price hikes It has also produced a boom for the 
middle and the small business (the 1 Bazari' m  the context of the Iranian 
revolution) catering to the buying spree of the "nouveau riche" In this 
way the benefits of the Gulf connection have gone far beyond tho /dio h w u  
their relatives working abroad This has dampened the agitational zeal of 
the poor and provided a useful but temporary safety valve for the military 
regime To most, an opportunity of job in the Middle East holds better 
prospects for the future than a change of government in Pakistan following 
a mass upsurge As long as this remains a viable option and the consequent 
prosperity and consumerism stays afloat, the politicians will face an uphill 
task to translate the widespread alienation from, and resentment against, 
the military into a sustained political agitation
Second, the direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan m  
December 1979, and the influx of Afghan refugees has been successfully used 
by the military government to deflect political pressures in the domestic 
political system by claiming that the regional geo-strategic environment 
does not warrant political activities, let alone agitation against the 
government The activities of the anti-military government circles, it is 
claimed, will undermine the nation's ability to deal effectively with the 
political and strategic fall-out of the Soviet presence m  Afghanistan The 
state-owned radio, T V and newspapers have continuously played up these 
themes which are shared by a considerable number of groups and people on the 
right of the centre These elements often join the government m  condemning 
their political adversaries on the ground that they are trying to engage in
agitational politics at a time when the security of lakisfin is "threatened" 
by the Soviet troops
The key to tne invulnerability of the ¿id regime is tie support it 
enjoys fron th< s moi military commanders General Zia-ul-Huq's inoffensive 
style with steaks of humality has given other senior commanders no reason 
far complaints The military government has been quite generous towards 
its colleagues m  the three Services The budgetory lllocation for the 
defense services rose by about 172 / during 1976-77 to 1982-83, compared 
with an increase of about 118 / during the Bhutto period The Armi' 
especially its higher echelons, were parcelled out several material 
benefits, i c jobs before and after retirement absorption in the 'Fauji 
ioundation" after retirement, an assignment in the Gulf states, pieces of 
land for construction of houses in cantonments and urban centres, facilities
for loans, etc A number of officers passed on the residential plots given 
to them at cheap rates to the civilians at the exhorbatant rates Their 
most valuable gain has been the 'access' and 'contact' with the decision­
makers which has its own 'advantages' and 'benefits' in a society suffering 
from the perennial 'scarcity' of the 'valued goods and services'
The Zia martial law has led to what liner describes as the "military 
colonization of other institutions" whereby "the military acts as a
'lcreservoir or core of personnel for the sensitive institutions of the state" 
The military officers are being gradually spread-out in the civil adminis­
tration, semi-government and autonomous corporations Many officers of the 
rank of Brigadier and above (mostly retired) are holding the positions of 
federal o^ provincial secretaries and the top or near top positions in 
government corporations and bodies They are also being appointed to the 
elite groups of the Central Superior Services The most common groups
yselected for their induction include the District Management Group (formerly 
the C S P ), the foreign Service of Pakistan, and the Police Service of 
Pakistan This has caused bitterness amongst their civilian counterparts 
who join these services after a cut-throat competitive examination A 
10 per cent quota of civil jobs has been fixed for the ex-servicemen But 
in several government corporation and autonomous bodies the actual ratio 
is more than the recommended fupure In mid-1982, out of 42 Pakistani 
ambassadors posted abroad, 18 came from the military (ihc Army 15, ihe 
Air Force 3)^°
The military has become a ladder for lucrative jobs after retirement 
m  almost all those states whit h have seen the ascendancy of the military 
to power Ayub Khan relied on this strategy durinp his rule But, unlike 
him who wís able to develop the alternate sources of support and thus push
the military partially i„ the background, General Zia-ul-Huq has not been
able to 'civilianize' his regime and has continued to lean heavily on the 
military for the sustenance of his regime This made him distribute the 
exploits of power in his constituency —  the military—  m  a more consistent 
and extensive manner than any previous military ruler in Pakistan "Military
rule thus means not only Islamic purity it also means big business _ for
51the military" The higher echelon* of the military have, in fact, emerged 
as the most privileged and entrenched caste in Pakistan
The success of the military regime in containing the expression of 
dissent has been marred by the gradual rise of political violence (murders, 
sabotage and arson) over the last couple of years At least three political 
leaders were TJSSTSsmated Two of them were pro-military government A 
retired judge of Supreme Court (who presided over Bhutto's murder trial
in the Lahore High Court) escaped an assassination attempt Several pro- 
military government leaders, especially the members of the Federal Coucnil 
received anonymous threats to their lives There were several instances of 
mysterious fires on the government property^ bomb blasts and hijacking 
attempts A rocket was fired at an aircraft taking-off from Rawalpindi 
m  February 1982 which missed the target by a narrow margin The reliable 
sources claimed that the said aircraft was carrying General Zia-ul-Huq The 
ruling generals do not see these activities as a consequence of the severe 
restrictions on political activities They describe these activities as tne 
acts of the anti-state and foreign inspired groups A large number of 
Pakistani social scientists see a correlation between the germination of 
violence m  politics and the continued clogging of the channels of expression 
and political participation
OBSERVATIONS
The Zia regime is well entrenched but its inability to evolve a 
viable political framework for the future and effect a transfer of power 
or 'civilianize1 itself is as pronounced as is the incapacity of the political 
elite to wrestle political initiative out of the hands of General Zia-ul-Huq 
In the past the genera* has been quite successful m  deflecting and 
containing political dissent He can continue to do so m  the future as 
long as, inter alia, the senior commanders are willing and capable of 
staying by his side This will enable the military rulers to hold on to 
power for some time but it is not likely to facilitate the widespread 
acceptance oftheir political-preference scale as the basis of the new 
political system for Pakistan
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The militar/ rulers postponed the national elections and expanded the 
goals of the coup with the hope that this would reduce politicization m  the 
polity and consolidate the position of those rightist political leaders who 
were favorably disposed towards the military regime They would then 
transfer power to or share it with, them But the strategies adopted b) 
the martial lav; authorities to achieve these objectives had the opposite 
effects As the process of accountability and alignment with the \ight 
adversely affected tne People’s Party which had retained a substantial 
following in the Punjab and the interior of Sind, and the 'Islamization* 
process touched on some of the fundamental features of the first-ever 
unanimously adopted Constitution (1973), these measures were bound to 
embroil the military m  the on-going political struggle The follow-up 
measures adopted by the military to secure the cooperation of the orthodo> 
and ultra-right groups and the crack down on their adversaries by a policy 
of suppression and rewards intensified the existing cleavages in the polity
The military rulers m  Pakistan are m  a paradox On the one hand 
praetonanism has become quite strong by the repeated intervention of the 
military in politics since the mid-fifties The present military rulers 
wish to provide a constitutional coverage to this practice so that no legal 
and constitutional questions are raised about their praetorian role On 
the other hand the emotional and ideological commitment to democratic 
process and civilian supremacy over the military is still strong in the 
society The military, as one scholar puts, "remains hostage to its orgins,,5<^  
The British legacy of the military*6 subordination to the executive/civil 
authority figures prominently in the military training program The political 
elite, bitter at the loss of power, persistently oppose any effort designed 
to institutionalize praetorianism They cite Jinnah who upheld the principle
of civilian supremacy over the military, and remind the military commanders 
that Pakistan was not conquered by a general but it was created through 
a democratic/political process under the leadership of a civilian political 
leader —  Jinnah —  and tnat the restoration of this tradition would ensure
5%the salvation of Pakistan m  the future
There are little prospects of an upheaval in Pakistan in the near 
future but, m  view of the wide discrepancy in the political perspectives 
of the ruling generals and the political elite, the military regime will 
continue to face opposition and legitimacy crisis The prolongation of the 
present political impasse or the enforcement of any form of diluted democracy 
under the title of Islamic Democracy will accentuate discontent alienation 
nd polarisation, and give a fillip to political violence The festering 
resentment, especially amongst those who find themselves at the periphery of 
the system or completel' excluded from the decision-making process, will 
mount heavy strains on the military, m  fact, the very fabric of the polity, 
thereby making a graceful transfer of power increasingly difficult
The experience of Pakistan suggests that it may be easy for a professional 
and disciplined army to assume political power in a crisis-ridden polity 
but a successful coup or the initial accomplishments in the post-coup 
period are no guarantees that the military rulers will be equally successful 
m  solving the basic social, political and economic problems which are the 
root-causes of the fragility of the civilian institutions m  the Third World 
states The longer they stay m  power, the more vulnerbale they become to 
the charges not dissimilar to those they once framed against the deoposed
regime
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N O T E S
1 Guy J Pauker "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade'
World Politics, voi 11 No 3, April 1959, pp 325-345 (p 342)
2 Edward Shils,"The Military m  the Political Development of the New States" 
in J J Johnson (ed ), The Role of the Military m  the Underdeveloped 
Countries, Princeton Princeton University press 1962, pp 7-67
3 Lucian W Pye,"Armies m  the Process of Political Modernization", m  
Ibid , pp 69-89
4 Morns Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations 
Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1964
5 H Daalder, The Role of the Military m  the Emerging Countries The Hague 
Mouton, 1962, p 19
6 See, for example G Kennedy, The Military m  the Third World, New York 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974, p 59 J P Lovell and C I E Kim, "The 
Military and Political Change in Asia" Pacific Affairs, Vol <L Nos 1 6 
2, Spring and Summer 1967, pp 113-123 D W. Chang "The Military and 
Nation-building ua Korea, Burma and Pakistan" Asian Survey Voi 9 No 11 
November 1969, pp 818-830 D Lerner & R D* Robinson,"Swords and 
Ploughshares The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Foice" World politics 
voi 13, No 1, October 1960, pp 19-44
7 J Stephen Hoadley, Soldiers and Politics m  Southeast Asia Cambridge, 
Mass Schenkman, 1975, p 211
8 Nicole Ball,"Third World Militaries and Politics An Introductory Essay" 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol XVII No 1, March 1982, pp 41-60
° A writer challenged the view that the military was a modernizing and 
stablizmg agent in the Third World See H. Bienen (ed ), The Military 
Intervenes Case Studies in Political Development, New York Russel Sage, 
1968 E A Nordlinger,"Soldiers in Mufti The Impact of Military Rule 
upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-western States" APSR,
Voi LXlv No 4, December 1970, op 1131-1148
10 A S  Cohen & K D* Mckinlay,"Performance and Instability m  Military and
non-military Regime Systems" APSR, Vol LXX No 3, September 1976,pp 850-864
11 R W Jackson,"Politicians in Uniform Military Governments and Social 
Change in the Third World" APSR, Vol.LXX No 4, December 1976,pp 1078-1097
I X  Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power, 
Beverly Hills Sage Publications, 1972, p. 79
13# Eric A Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics Military Coups and Governments, 
Englewood Cliffs Prentice Hall, 1977, p 119
Joseph P Smaldone,"The Paradox of Military Politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa", in Charles L Cochran (ed ), Civil-Military Relations, Neu York 
The Free Press, 1974, p 219
l5~ Edward Feit The 'V.rmeri Bureaucrats Boston Houghton Mifflm 1973 pp 3 1£
16 For the details of the military's contribution to the nation-buildmp and
development, see Raymond A Moore,'The Use of Army in Nation Building 
Ihc Case of Pakistan" Asian Survey Voi 9 No 6 June 1969 pp 447-456 
Hasan Askan Rizvi The Military and Politics In Pakistan 2nd edition 
Lahore Progressive Publishers, 1976 pp 76-81, 169-72 283-80
17 Shinn Tahir-Kheli 'The Military in Contemporary Pakistan Armed Forces 
and Society Voi 6 No 4 Summer 1980 pp 639-653
1Ô General Zia-ul-Huq's first address to the nation Dawn Overseas Weekly, 
July 10, 1977 See also his first press conference The New York iimeo 
July 9, 1977
19 See, General Zia-ul-Huq's interview to the D B C Dawn (Karachi)
October 18, 1982
20 Press Conference at Lahore Daily Jang (Lahore), March 22 1982
The Muslim (Islamabad), March 22, 1982 Farcastern Economic Review 
April 2, 1982 See also Daily Jang (Lahore), August 9 1982
2 1 Dawn Overseas Weekly, July 10, 1977 General Zia-ul-Huq repeated this 
promise on several occasions, see Ibid July 24, 1977 August 14 & 21 
1977 September 25" 1977 Newsweek, July 18, 1977 Pakistan's Chief
Delegate to the U N affirmed to the General Assembly that the military 
government will transfer power to the elected representatives after 
holding elections on October 18, 1977 Dawn (Karachi) September 29 1977
2 X  Most of the elected members with party affiliations,especially those 
v/ho were said to have links with the People's Party^ were disqualified 
by the martial law authorities
23 A day after the elections of the local bodies General Zia-ul-Huq said 
that nowhere had the Holy Quran enjoined that General Zia should 
definitely hold elections on November 17, and that Islam and national 
solidarity would be given priority over the holding of elections 
Daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), September 27, 1979
2lj Dawn Oversedj Weekly April 12 1980
25" Dawn (Karachi) april 14, 1982
2é Ibid , May 13 1982 V ïewpoint (Lahore), October 21, 1982
27 General Zia-ul-Huq's interview The Washington Post, December 9, 1982
Daily Jang (Lahore) February 25, 1982 See, another statement by the 
Interior Minister The Muslim, April 11 1982
VievTJOlnt (Lahore), September 30, 1979 and September 23, 1982
30 The demonstration of mass support was as much a surprise for the People's 
Party as it was for the martial law authorities Before this the People's 
Party was thinking of boycotting the elections
31 William L Richter Persistent Praetorianism Pakistán s Third 
Regime 1 Pacific Affairs. Voi 51 No 3 Fall, 1978 pp 406-426 
Salman Taseer, Bhutto A Political Biography. New Delhi Vikas
ili 1 i tary 
1980
TS7R 7  ^r ^ " 8 ute PaperS Were 1SSUed by the government in1978-79 before the execution of Dhutto (1) White Paper on the Conduct
!v-w!??ran hIectlon.s ™  March 1977 Jul7 1978^ papes 1449 (2) Summary
'?f|Whl-?-Pap0r °n .:b'e Conduct of tl)e General Elections in March~Ï977 
Uly Pages 1 1 8 ( 3 7  White Paper on Misuse of Media Auoimt 1U7R
pages 363 (4) White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto
Ianr Vo1 1 .g — Z A Bhu»o. His Family and A s s o c T ? ^ —
January 1979, pages 179 V d  11 Treatment of F u n H a ^ I T silt,. 
.Institutions January 1979 Pages 353 Voi 111 Misuse of the Instrument
1979tatpaees°8Î T ' 1 PaReS 228 Vo1 lv The Januar,, pages 81 See also Sameel Ahmed Qureshi, An Analysis of
v°? vTv°uaro pfkl8tanl Politics Bhutto versus the Military Asian Survey Vol XIX No 9, September 1979, pp 910-921 -----------
33
31#
3:T
General Zia-ul-Huq's interview Urdu Digest (Lahore) Septenbci 1977 p 28
Khalid Bin Sayeed, 
Change New York Politics m  Pakistan The Nature and Direction of Praeger 1980, p 179 Richter o p T ~ ---------
Daily Jang (Karachi), April 16 L979
36 The Pakistan Times (Lahore) July 13 1978
^  ftaily Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), April if 1979
33
39
Aitazaz Ahsan, 'July Five 1982 —  The Five Years 
The Muslim (Islamabad), July 5 1982 of Martial Law
It may be pointed out here that women had always enjoyed the right to 
vote in Pakistan Lately many orthodox and fundamentalists started 
talking of denying the right to vote to women
The summary of the report was leaked to a section of the press 
The Muslim (Islamabad), July 27, 1982
41 Aitzaz Ahsan,"Army's Role in Future Political Set up Another Viewpoint' 
Dawn (Karachi), May 31 1982
^  The .Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Article 245 
The oath prescribed for the military-men in the Third Schedule of the 
Constitution specifically forbids them to take part in political activity 
of any kind In addition to this the 1973 Constitution says that any 
attempt to abrogate or subvert the Constitution "by the use of force 
or show of force or by other unconsitutlonal means" shall be be regarded 
as an act of high treason (Article 6 (l) 6« (ii))
¿*3 See the statements of General Zia-ul-Huq Dawn (Karachi), March 29 1979
Daily Jang (Lahore) May 27, 1982 Daily Nawa-l-Waqt (Lahore), June 23
4V Dawn (Karachi), May 7, 1982
45" Daily Naw-i-Waqt (Lahore), June 22 1979 Dawn Overseas Weekly
December 9, 1982 The Pakistan Times (Lahore) September 15 1977
1^ 6 See the statement of Pakistan's Interior Minister m  support of the 
constitutional role for the military Daily Jang (Rawalpindi),November 
16, 1982 See also Z A Suleri, Men and Matters Phasing Out the 
Military" The Pakistan Times (Lahore), May 21 1982
hi 'See editorials m  Daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), May 15T 1982
Daily Jasarat (Karachi), May 8, 1982 A R Siddiqi "Army's Role in 
Future Political Set up A view point" Dawn (Karachi), May 15, 1982 
Aitzaz Ahsan,"Army's Role in Future Political Set up Another View point" 
Ibid , May 31 and June 1, 1982
kS For details, see Viewpoint (Lahore), September 16 and October 14 1982
The Muslim (Islamabad), November 7, 1982 (Editorial The Lawyers Protest)
l*q S E Finer "The Military and Politics in the Third World, m  W Scott 
Thompson (ed ), The Third World Premises of U S Polle/ San irane iso 
Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1978, p 34
50 Official statement Daily Janp, (Lahore) Anril 21. 1932 .. .
(Islamabad), May 19, 1982 ----------
S\ Fergus M Bordewich,"The Pakistan Army Sword of Islam Asia, September- 
October 1982, pp 16-23, 48-53 ----
5 ^  Stephen P Cohen, The Pakistan Army Images of War. Visions of Peace 
Berkely University of California Press, forthcoming “ ------- ’
53 The political leaders emphasize these points to their conversation and 
statements but most of these are either not published or are briefly 
noted in the press See, for example Dally Jang (Karachi), June 1 1979
fiaily Nawa-i-Wacrt (Lahore), August 16, 1979. Tbe Muslim (Islamabad 
October Daily Aman (Karachi), ?u)y
